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OPINION OF THE COURT
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents a number of
questions arising out of a trademark
infringement dispute between two banking
institutions.  The dispute is an outgrowth
of aggressive and expansionist banking
flowing f rom the Congressional
liberalization in recent years of  national
banking laws.  Citizens National Bank of
Evans City (CNBEC) is a community bank
founded in 1878 in Evans City,
Pennsylvania, north of Pittsburgh, under
the name of Citizens Bank of Evansburgh.
In 1907, the bank became federally
chartered and adopted its current name.
The bank also has refered to itself as
“Citizens’”  in its advertisements,
promotional materials, and customer
communications.  CNBEC now has sixteen
branches in the Northwestern region of
Pennsylvania.
The Citizens Financial Group, Inc.
(CFG) is a subsidiary holding company of
the Royal Bank of Scotland.  In July 2001,
CFG purchased the retail banking
operations of Mellon Bank and announced
that it would, and in December 2001 did,
conve rt all  Mellon branches in
Pennsylvania to “Citizens Bank” branches.
CNBEC claimed that nine of these former
Mellon Bank branches were located near
CNBEC branches, and in addition some of
the branches in Butler County were located
on the same streets.  Upon learning of
CFG’s announcement of its plan to rename
the Mellon Bank branches in Pennsylvania
as Citizens Bank, CNBEC sent a cease and
desist letter to CFG requesting that CFG
not use “Citizens” as a name with respect
to its Western Pennsylvania branches.
CFG responded by filing this suit in the
United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania seeking
a declaratory judgment that CNBEC could
not prevent it from using the name
“Citizens.”  CNBEC answered the
complaint by asserting affirmative
defenses and a counterclaim alleging
trademark infringement and unfair
competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and unjust
enrichment.
CNBEC then filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction, which the District
Court denied following an evidentiary
hearing.  On appeal, this Court affirmed
the denial.  Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v.
Citizens Nat’l Bank of Evans City, 30 Fed.
Appx. 24 (3d Cir. 2002).  The parties then
proceeded to a jury trial at which CNBEC
asserted three counter-claims.   CNBEC
raised two claims of trademark
infringement, first that CFG’s “Citizens
Bank” mark infringed its mark of the word
“Citizens” standing alone, and second, that
CFG’s “Citizens Bank” mark infringed its
full “Citizens National Bank” mark.
CNBEC also claimed that CFG’s conduct
constituted unfair competition due to the
confusing similarity of the marks and that
3CFG had been unjustly enriched by its
infringement.  
With  regard to CNBEC’s
infringement claims, the jury found that
CNBEC had trademark rights in
“Citizens,” that CFG’s use of the “Citizens
Bank” mark in CNBEC’s market was
likely to cause confusion with CNBEC’s
mark “Citizens,” but that CFG’s “Citizens
Bank” mark would not likely be confused
with CNBEC’s “Citizens National Bank”
mark.  The jury rejected CNBEC’s claim
for damages regarding unfair competition
and unjust enrichment.  
The District Court thereupon
considered CNBEC’s motion for a
permanent injunction.  The Court refused
to enjoin CFG’s use of its “Citizens Bank”
mark in CNBEC’s market.  Instead, it
molded the jury’s verdict of infringement
in favor of CFG on all of CNBEC’s claims
and sua sponte issued an injunction
restraining CNBEC’s use of the “Citizens”
mark.  The injunction requires CNBEC
always to identify itself as “Citizens
National Bank” in the text of promotional
material, advertisements and documents,
despite the jury’s finding that CNBEC
maintained a protected interest in the
“Citizens” mark standing alone.  CNBEC
timely appealed, and CFG cross appealed.
We hold that the District Court abused its
discretion by denying CNBEC’s motion
for injunctive relief and issuing an
injunction sua sponte against CNBEC.
Therefore, we will affirm in part and
reverse in part.
I.  Background
CNBEC maintains 16 local
branches in Northwestern Pennsylvania,
twelve in Butler County, three in Northern
Allegheny County, and one in Armstrong
County.  CNBEC acknowledges that the
majority of its customers live in Butler
County, but asserts that its Allegheny
County customers account for about 13%
of its total accounts, 20% of its total
combined deposit/loan volume, and about
30% of its profits.  CNBEC claims that as
of August 1, 2001, it had 64,132 accounts
in Butler County, 9,886 accounts
representing about $50 million in deposits
in Northern Allegheny County, 2,806
accounts in Beaver County, and 1,170
accounts in Armstrong County.  Prior to
CFG’s entry into CNBEC’s marketplace,
CNBEC had been the only “Citizens”
retail bank in the area.
A.  CNBEC Advertising
Over the years, CNBEC has spent
millions of dollars in advertising its
services and diverse products under the
marks “Citizens National Bank” and
“Citizens.”  It has advertised in Allegheny
County in the North Pittsburgh edition of
the Post Gazette, the Tribune Review, and
the North Hills News Record, as well as
the Butler Eagle and some of the smaller
newspapers in Butler and Armstrong
Counties.  The number of advertisements
has varied depending upon its campaigns
and targets at the time.  From time to time,
CNBEC has also sponsored local
community events in its marketplace such
as football programs, ballets, and other
sporting events and musical performances,
which have been a form of advertising. 
4CNBEC has also advertised
campaigns on radio stations covering
Allegheny and the surrounding counties
and television station KDKA, which
covers Western Pennsylvania and the
entire Greater Pittsburgh area.  In addition,
it has placed flyers in customer statements,
utilized billboards for outdoor advertising
in the Gibsonia, Slippery Rock and Butler
areas, and for the past five years prior to
the jury trial, it has maintained a wall
painted on the Masonic Building in the
City of Butler with its logo, the name
“Citizens”and the tag l ine “The
Uncommon Bank.”  It also has placed
listings in numerous telephone directories
circulated throughout the Pittsburgh area
and has issued numerous press releases
each year in its claimed market.  CNBEC
has issued hundreds of thousands of its
checks and debit cards, carrying its mark,
to its customers and merchants. 
CNBEC witnesses testified that at
least since the 1950s, employees and
customers have referred to it as “Citizens.”
Competing banks in that market as well as
the media also refer to CNBEC as
“Citizens.” 
Since at least 1995, the bank policy
with respect to the use of its name has
been that the first time the bank’s name
was used, the entire bank name, Citizens
National Bank, should be used.
Subsequent uses can be either “Citizens”
or “Citizens National Bank.”   For
example, an advertisement offered in
evidence for CNBEC’s 18-month CD
carries at its top only “Citizens” but at the
bottom in much smaller print appears
“Citizens National Bank.”  The record
contains more than seventy-five CNBEC
advertisements and promotional materials
that refer to CNBEC as “Citizens”
predating CFG’s acquisition of the Mellon
banks. In another fifty instances,
“Citizens” appears as the first reference to
the Bank.  During 2001, the year CFG
opened its doors in the CNBEC
marketplace as “Citizens Bank,” CNBEC
spent $366,000 for print advertising.  In
the year 2002, it spent $247,000 on print
advertising.
B.  Consumer Confusion
In the town of Wexford in
Allegheny County, and in Butler,
Zelienople, and Saxonburg in Butler
County, CFG’s branches are located on the
same street as CNBEC’s branches.  Both
banks frequently refer to themselves
simply as “Citizens.  CFG’s full-page
newspaper announcement in the Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette of its acquisition of the
Mellon banks referred to itself as either
“Citizens” or “Citizens Bank” five times.
Another contained the headline “Welcome
to Citizens,” and others referred to itself in
the text as simply “Citizens” with
“Citizens Bank” and its logo at the bottom
of the page.
Similar to CNBEC, CFG also
introduced many financial products with
“Citizens” and with “Citizens Bank” and
logo at the bottom of the ad.  Examples are
the introduction of banking products and
services available for law firms, Citizens
SBA program, and Citizens business
owners, commerc ial banking and
5international services “by one of the
largest banks in the world,” the Citizens
Circle Money Market Account, Citizens
Phone Bank, Citizens Fixed-Rate
Annuities, Citizens Circle Gold Checking
Account, and Citizens Business Premium
Money Market Account.
CNBEC produced testimony of
CFG customers mistakenly doing business
with CNBEC branches, attempting to cash
CFG checks, depositing money and
making loan payments on CFG loans.
CFG customers also used CNBEC’s ATM
machines believing they were CFG’s and
called CNBEC branches with respect to
CFG accounts and promotions.  CNBEC
employees alleged to have recorded more
than 2000 instances of confusion during
the current litigation.
CNBEC also produced at trial as
expert witnesses, Dr. Maureen Morrin of
Rutgers University and Dr. Vihas Mital of
the University of Pittsburgh.  Dr. Morrin
testified that CFG’s mark is likely to cause
consumer confusion because Citizens
National Bank and Citizens Bank are
essentially identical in consumers’ minds
due to consumers’ tendency to shorten
brand names in speech and memory.  To
consumers, CFG’s and CNBEC’s marks
are both “Citizens.”  Moreover, Dr. Morrin
pointed out that both banks in their
promotional materials, print ads and web
sites commonly refer to themselves as just
“Citizens.” 
Dr. Morrin also noted that another
contributing factor to the likelihood of
confusion is that the branch names and the
logos are remarkably “similar in
appearance.”  Dr. Morrin opined that the
word “national” in CNBEC’s name is not
very helpful in enabling consumers to
differentiate between the two banks
because “national” is commonly used in
bank names, and it is an abstract word.  It
is hard to visualize a concrete image of an
abstract word, she testified, and “humans
have a hard time storing and retrieving
abstract words in their memory.”
Based on a survey of consumers in
the Pittsburgh area, Dr. Mital testified that
an overwhelming majority shortened the
bank’s name and referred to Citizens Bank
as “Citizens.”  He also conducted a survey
of adult banking consumers in the four
county area of Allegheny, Butler, Beaver,
and Armstrong.  According to that survey
of 300 people, respondents supplied 1057
bank names.  Of the 1057 names, 71% of
those names were shortened.  With respect
to Citizens Bank, 76% “shortened the
name to just ‘Citizen’ or ‘Citizens.’”  
CFG admitted that CNBEC
customers tried to make deposits into CFG
accounts, make payment on CNBEC loans,
cash CNBEC checks, or use ATMs at CFG
branches, all under the belief that they
were banking with CNBEC.  However,
CFG claimed that the instances of
confusion were minimal and decreased
after the conversion of Mellon branches to
Citizens Bank branches was completed.
CFG offered into evidence its
trademark registration of the name
“Citizens Bank” and its service mark in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office
6dated August 28, 2001, as well as federal
trademark registrations for various service
marks such as Citizens Select Gold,
Citizens Circle and Citizens Nouvelle
Credit Program.  All of these trademarks
and service marks were registered with the
United States Patent Office between
March 11, 1997 and March 18, 2003.
CFG leveled its attack on
CNBEC’s claim of seniority to the use of
“Citizens” by eliciting evidence through
cross examination of inconsistencies in the
testimony of CNBEC’s witnesses,
exaggerations in its geographic claims as
to its market area, and the weakness of
“Citizens” as a mark.  CNBEC’s president,
Margaret Wier, admitted that CNBEC had
no trademark in the words “Citizens Bank”
and had not used those words to represent
her institution.  CFG also offered in
evidence a communication from an
assis tant in CN BE C’s m arketing
department, Sue Kushonardit, to CNBEC’s
branch managers and commercial loan
managers, advising them that “CFG’s
corporate colors are green and the logo is
uniquely different from our own.”
Counsel for CFG developed
through cross examination of CNBEC’s
president that its principal advertising
agency, Larson O’Brien Acumens, offered
some suggestions to its vice-president,
Betsy Rab, in February 2002, that would
add to the confusion of the public with
respect to the two banks, thereby
strengthening CNBEC’s legal case.
CNBEC’s president conceded that these
suggestions amounted to dirty tricks but
CNBEC “did not implement any” of them.
C.  Jury Instructions, the Verdict and the
Injunction
After instructing the jury generally
on the law with respect to the burden of
proof, the Court informed the jury that it
would be the Court’s responsibility to
determine whether CFG would prevail on
its claim seeking the right to use its
registered mark “Citizens Bank” in the
disputed areas of Pennsylvania.  The Court
explained that the jury’s role would be to
determine whether CNBEC would obtain
judgment on its claims of trademark
infringement, unfair competition, and
unjust enrichment.
The Court provided the jury with a
general background in trademark law,
noting that the two major objectives in the
law regarding trademarks are to protect
customers from becoming confused or
misled as to the source from which
products or services originate, and to
protect the owner’s value and business
goodwill associated with his or her
trademark.  The Court explained that even
though CFG obtained federal registration
for its marks, CNBEC can still prevent
CFG from using its registered marks in its
market area by demonstrating that CNBEC
has a protected interest in the mark and
that a likelihood of confusion would result
if CFG also used the mark in the same
market area.  On the other hand, the Court
noted that if there is no likelihood of
confusion “between CFG’s Citizens Bank
mark and CNBEC’s marks, then both
parties can use their respective marks in all
areas.” 
7The Court outlined for the jury the
factors to be considered in determining
whether there was a likelihood of
confusion and the weight to be given to
each.  The Court explained that if CNBEC
has established the right to the word
“Citizens” standing alone as a trademark,
the jury must place the mark into one of
four groups in the spectrum of
distinctiveness.  These four groups listed
in order from the strongest to weakest are,
(1) fanciful and arbitrary, (2) suggestive,
(3) descriptive, and (4) generic.  The Court
commented that  “fanciful or arbitrary and
suggestive marks are considered inherently
distinctive and are entitled to immediate
protection.”  See also Checkpoint Sys.,
Inc . v .  C h e c k  P o in t  So f tware
Technologies, Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 282 (3d
Cir. 2001) (explaining the four levels of
trademark distinctiveness).1 
The Court concluded its jury
instruction with an explanation of the
damages sought by CNBEC and the
elements that must be proven for such
relief.  The Court then submitted to the
jury a verdict slip which contained fifteen
questions.  The first six questions and the
responses of the jury are pertinent to our
review.  
QUESTION #1:  Do you find that CNBEC
has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that CNBEC has used “Citizens”
standing alone as a trademark?
JURY: Yes.
QUESTION #2:  Do you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
mark “Citizens” standing alone is ... (A)
generic, (B) merely descriptive, (C)
suggestive or arbitrary or fanciful?
JURY:(C) 
[The Jury was directed to skip to Question
#4]
QUESTION #4:  Do you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that a
likelihood of confusion exists between
CFG’s Marks and CNBEC’s “Citizens”
standing-alone mark?
JURY:  Yes.
QUESTION #5:  Do you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that a
likelihood of confusion exists between
    1 The Court also instructed the jury on
the determination of whether CNBEC’s
“Citizens” mark had acquired a
secondary meaning, whereby a
significant portion of the public
associates banking services under the
name “Citizens” as coming from a single
source.  However, because the jury found
the mark “Citizens” to be either
suggestive or arbitrary/fanciful on the
distinctive scale, it was not required to
address secondary meaning in order to
find that CNBEC had a protected interest
in the “Citizens” mark and that there was
a likelihood of confusion with CFG’s
marks.  See Checkpoint Sys., 269 F.3d at
283 n.10 (describing how even a
descriptive mark may be entitled to
strong protection if it has developed a
secondary meaning).  
8CFG’s Marks and CNBEC’s “Citizens
National Bank” mark?
JURY:  No.
QUESTION #6:  Do you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that
CNBEC has proven that is has been
injured as a proximate result of CFG’s
infringement?
JURY:  No.
After answering “No” to Question
#6, the verdict slip informed that jury that
it had found a verdict in favor of CFG and
that its task was complete. 
Several days later, the Court
considered CNBEC’s application for a
permanent injunction.  Although labeled a
hearing, there was no jury, no evidence
presented, or oral argument.  The Court
concluded on the briefs submitted by
counsel for the parties that an injunction
against CFG should not issue.  The Court
arrived at this result by balancing the
equities and considering the factors
enumerated in §35 of the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition (1995).  The
Court determined that CNBEC had not
proven bad faith or that CFG had
deliberately infringed on CNBEC’s marks.
It concluded that a full injunction directed
to CFG would have devastating effects on
its business and its customers, not only in
CNBEC’s market area but throughout
Pennsylvania, a consequence even beyond
the scope sought by CNBEC.  However, it
did not offer a descriptive explanation for
this awesome prediction.  
With respect to the public interest,
the Court concluded that an injunction
would increase confusion rather than
prevent it.  The Court reasoned that if CFG
were required to change its name in
CNBEC’s market area as a result of an
injunction, it would still be required to
indicate to consumers that it was owned by
or otherwise affiliated with Citizens Bank.
Also contributing heavily to the Court’s
decision was a determination that there
was evidence of “unclean hands” on the
part of CNBEC in this litigation, and that
such evidence “is significant.”  The Court
concluded that this factor weighed heavily
against the granting of a full injunction.  It
also believed that granting an injunction
against CFG would be difficult, if not
impossible, to enforce because it had its
own trademark rights in areas other than
CNBEC’s market area.  The Court asserted
that the use of broad ranged media for the
purposes of advertisements and the
increasing use of internet banking added to
the difficulty.  Instead of granting an
injunction against CFG, the Court sua
sponte concluded that the principles of
equity and the record in this case
compelled it to impose an injunction
requiring CNBEC to use the term
“National” as part of its name when it first
refers to itself in any document,
advertising, or promotion, regardless of the
type or medium used.  The Court
thereupon molded the verdict entered by
the jury and entered a verdict in favor of
CFG on its declaratory judgment claim and
against CNBEC on all of its counterclaims.
II.  Evidentiary Rulings
The four issues raised by CNBEC
9on appeal are:  (1) the refusal of the
District Court to enjoin CFG’s use of its
“Citizens Bank” mark after a jury
determined that it infringed CNBEC’s
“Citizens” mark; (2) the District Court’s
exclusion of CNBEC’s proffered expert
testimony regarding a likelihood of
consumer confusion between the parties’
marks; (3) the District Court’s exclusion of
evidence of  purported consumer
confusion; and (4) the Court’s admission
of evidence of third-party use of the word
“Citizens” in trademarks outside of the
relevant marketplace and the Court’s
subsequent jury instruction that these
third-party marks were relevant to a
determination of the commercial strength
of CNBEC’s “Citizens” mark.  
In its conditional cross-appeal to be
considered only if this Court reverses any
of the District Court’s rulings, CFG
contends that the District Court erred in
admitting generalized hearsay testimony
concerning unspecified instances of
alleged confusion and in formulating its
jury instruction concerning the definition
of “use” of the term “Citizens” for
purposes of acquiring trademark rights. 
We turn first to CNBEC’s
arguments regarding the District Court’s
evidentiary rulings.  
A.  Exclusion of CNBEC’s Proffered
Expert Testimony  
CFG filed a pre-trial motion to
preclude proposed expert testimony of
Robert Reitter on behalf of CNBEC on the
ground that his survey relied on an
“improper universe” because the survey
was conducted outside of CNBEC’s
market.  Reitter interviewed people at two
malls in Allegheny County, Ross Park
Mall and Robinson Towne Center.  The
Court agreed with CFG and excluded the
testimony.  CNBEC now appeals this
evidentiary ruling.  The District Court’s
decision to exclude proposed expert
testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Montgomery County v. Microvote Corp.,
320 F.3d 440, 445 (3d Cir. 2003).
The District Court was concerned
about the propriety and trustworthiness of
Reitter’s survey.  A “universe” is “that
segment of the population whose
perceptions and state of mind are relevant
to the issues in the case.”  McCarthy on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition §
32:159 (4th ed. 2003).  “A survey of the
wrong ‘universe’ will be of little probative
value in litigation.”  Id.  The Court noted
that the proponent of the survey bears the
burden of proving that the universe is
proper.  Id.; see also 3A Callmann on
Unfair Competition, Trademarks and
Monopolies § 21:67) (4th ed. 2001).  
It is not disputed that the consumer
confusion at issue here is known as
“reverse confusion.”  “Reverse confusion
occurs when a larger, more powerful
company [here, CFG] uses the trademark
of a smaller, less powerful senior owner
[here, CNBEC] and thereby causes likely
confusion as to the source of the senior
user’s goods or services.”  Fisons
Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries,
Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 474 (3d Cir. 1994).  The
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District Court observed that “in reverse
confusion cases . . . the appropriate
universe is the ‘senior user’s [i.e.
CNBEC’s] customer base.”  Citizens Fin.
Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of
Evans City, No. 01-1524, slip op. at 7
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2003) (citing McCarthy
§ 32:159).  
The Court then considered
evidence showing that CNBEC operated
sixteen branches in Butler County, no
branches in Beaver County, one branch in
Armstrong County, and three branches in
northern Allegheny County near the Butler
County line.  The District Court stated
“[f]or the past 108 years, CNBEC and its
predecessors in interest have offered retail
banking services in this area and not
beyond.  Thus, in this case there can be no
doubt that CNBEC’s customer ‘base’ is
within Butler county and extreme northern
Allegheny county rather than Allegheny
county as a whole.”  Id.  The Court noted
that “[t]he closest CNBEC branches are 7
and 17 miles, respectively, away from the
malls,” and the remaining branches were
“further away.”  Id. at 8.
The Court disagreed with
CNBEC’s argument that the universe at
issue consisted of potential customers of
both parties because the universe in a
reverse confusion case should be limited to
the senior user’s customer base.  See
McCarthy § 32:159; 3A Callmann § 21:67.
The Court noted that Reitter testified, and
CNBEC acknowledged at the hearing, that
he and CNBEC would have preferred to
conduct the survey at Clearview Mall in
Butler County but that mall refused to
allow Reitter to conduct the survey there.
Reitter also acknowledged that he could
have conducted the survey somewhere else
in Butler County, but it would have been
more difficult.  However, “[t]he
geographical area surveyed cannot be
based on mere sampling convenience
rather than upon scientific or sampling
grounds.”  McCarthy § 32:161.
The Court further disagreed with
CNBEC’s argument that its “universe”
should include all of Allegheny County
because it had a marketing presence
beyond Butler County in the Greater
Pittsburgh area.  Specifically, the Court
noted that “[t]he scope, media type,
volume, and frequency of [CNBEC’s]
advertising and promotional efforts
regularly focus[ed] on Butler county, not
Allegheny county,”  and that “the evidence
indicates that CNBEC’s advertising and
marketing efforts outside of Butler County
are sporadic.”  Citizens Fin. Group, No.
01-1524, slip op. at 9.The Court
determined that any customers that
CNBEC may obtain outside of their main
customer base of Butler County and
Northern Allegheny county would be “spill
over” which would not be a part of
CNBEC’s customer base.  Id.  The Court
also rejected some of the methodology
used by Reitter in his survey questions as
being vague, imprecise, overly inclusive,
or overly exclusive.  Id. at 9-10.
Exercising its role as the
“gatekeeper” regarding the proffered
expert witness testimony, the Court
concluded that Reitter’s report was too
fundamentally flawed to be admissible.  Id.
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at 10.  The Court therefore excluded the
proffered testimony under Daubert and
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
Alternatively, the Court excluded the
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence
403, concluding that the danger of unfair
prejudice far outweighed the minimum
probative value of Reitter’s testimony.  Id.
at 11.  See, e.g., Trouble v. The Wet Seal,
Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 291, 306-308
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).  The Court explained
that “[i]f the universe is skewed, then the
conclusion will similarly be skewed.  If an
expert, a person with special knowledge
and expertise, testifies as to the skewed
results, a jury is likely to give special
weight to the skewed conclusion.”  Id.
CNBEC argues that Reitter’s
survey constitutes highly probative
evidence of likelihood of confusion and
that the Court erred in excluding the
evidence from consideration by the jury.
According to CNBEC, 152 of the 213
respondents, or 71%, exhibited “reverse
confusion” either by identifying a CFG
location in response to the CNBEC
advertisement or stating that the bank in
the CNBEC advertisement was affiliated
with Mellon Bank. 
CNBEC argues also that the Court
misinterpreted case law regarding the
composition of an appropriate survey
universe in a reverse confusion case.
Specifically, it takes issue with the Court’s
conclusion that in a reverse confusion
case, the universe is limited to the senior
user’s “customer base.”  CNBEC argues
that the Court’s conclusion was based on
two treatises, McCarthy and Callman, both
of which relied on a single court decision,
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d
733 (2d Cir. 1994), but that Sterling did
not support the Court’s exclusion.
CNBEC also takes issue with the
Court’s factual findings, contending that
shoppers at both malls have access to its
banking services, and that Reitter’s
methodology and use of a “screener”
question was proper.  Finally, CNBEC
argues that the Court’s “critique” of
Reitter’s methodology should affect only
its weight but not its admissibility.  See
Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co.,
108 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 1997),
United States v. 88 Cases, etc., 187 F.2d
967, 974 (3d Cir. 1951); 5 McCarthy §
32:162 (selection of an inappropriate
universe generally affects the weight of
survey and not its admissibility).
In Sterling, 14 F.3d 733, a United
States drug company sued Bayer AG, a
German drug company, for infringement
of the trademark “Bayer” in Sterling’s
market.  Both companies held rights in the
trademark for historical reasons.  Id. at
737.  It was undisputed that Sterling was a
senior user of the trademark in its market.
Id. at 738.   The Sterling court rejected
Bayer AG, the junior user’s, argument that
a consumer survey regarding likelihood of
confusion should include Bayer AG’s
customer base in the United States.  Id. at
741.  The Court held that under the theory
of reverse confusion, as opposed to the
traditional theory of confusion, the
universe was limited to the senior user’s
customer base.  Id.  
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Sterling’s holding was cited with
approval by the two leading treatises and
was the position adopted by the District
Court here, that is, the proper universe
under CNBEC’s theory of reverse
confusion was limited to CNBEC’s
customer base, not to CFG’s customer
base.  CNBEC interprets Sterling to mean
that the universe should include consumers
whose perceptions are at issue and have
access to the marks of both parties.
However, in our view, Sterling does not
stand for such a proposition.  The Sterling
court stated that “[w]here, as here, the
relevant issue is whether consumers
mistakenly believe that the senior user’s
products actually originate with the junior
user, it is appropriate to survey the senior
user’s customers.”  Id. at 741.  Although
Sterling dealt with a difference between
the junior and senior users’ customers
based on products, as opposed to different
geographic regions, the rule is the same.
The court should limit survey evidence in
reverse confusion cases to the customers
of the senior user.  We do not believe that
the District Court abused its discretion in
determining that the consumers surveyed
in this case were located outside of
CNBEC’s customer base. 
CNBEC’s argument that any
problems of Reitter’s survey should have
affected only its evidentiary weight but not
its admissibility is also unpersuasive.  The
District Court excluded the survey because
Reitter’s methodology was fundamentally
flawed and because the danger of undue
prejudice far outweighed the limited
probative value of the survey, especially
for a jury.  The courts have held generally
that mere technical unreliability goes to the
weight accorded a survey, not its
admissibility.  See, e.g., Southland Sod
Farms, 108 F.3d at 1143.  The Court in
this case concluded that Reitter’s survey
did not suffer from mere technical flaws,
but from fatal flaws.  Thus, the Court
appropriately fulfilled its duty as a
gatekeeper in excluding this evidence.
Finally, CNBEC has failed to show
that the Court committed plain error in its
findings of facts as to what constituted its
customer base.  The Court cited CNBEC’s
own documentary evidence to make the
determination that it had business
primarily in Butler County and in the
northern tip of Allegheny County.
CNBEC has also failed to show that the
Court committed plain error regarding
whether its shoppers at the two malls were
within the universe of CNBEC’s customer
base and whether Reitter’s “screener”
question was proper.  Accordingly, we
hold that CNBEC has failed to show an
abuse of discretion by the District Court
and affirm its ruling to exclude the
proffered expert testimony.
B. Exclusion of Certain Written
Evidence Purporting to Show Instances of
“Actual Confusion”
CNBEC also attacks the District
Court’s establishment of guidelines to
insure that CNBEC’s “confusion log”
entries prepared by CNBEC’s employees
satisfied the Federal Rules of Evidence
before being admitted.  CFG filed a
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pretrial motion to exclude CNBEC’s
“confusion log” entries as inadmissible
hearsay.  CNBEC conceded that log
entries were hearsay, but argued that they
fell within the present sense impression
exception under Fed. R. Evid. 803(1).  The
Court granted in part and denied in part
CFG’s motion and established guidelines
for the admissibility of CNBEC’s log
entries under the “present sense”
exception. 
CNBEC does not dispute the
Court’s disposition of its argument
regarding the exceptions to the hearsay
rule.  Rather, CNBEC specifically
challenges the Court’s two guideline
requirements:  requiring log entries to (1)
“specifically mention Mellon or CFG” and
(2) “describe the specific evidence of the
direct link to Mellon or CFG in either the
form of (a) ‘documentary evidence,’ such
as specifically referring to a deposit slip,
or (b) ‘a clear and specific statement by the
customer.’” Citizens Fin. Group, No. 01-
1524, slip. op. at 14.  The guidelines also
required exclusion of log entries that
reflected “the thought process, conclusion,
analysis or interpretation” of the CNBEC
employees who recorded the entries.  Id. at
15.  CNBEC asserts that the Court “[cited]
no legal support and [articulated] no
rationale for its heightened evidentiary
requirements” and that the Court’s
requirements were inconsistent with the
standards of admissibility under Fed. R.
Evid. 803(1).  We review the District
Court’s guidelines for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 220
(3d Cir. 2000).  
In general, “actual confusion”
evidence collected by employees of a party
in a trademark action must be viewed with
skepticism because it tends to be biased or
self-serving.  See Checkpoint Sys., 269
F.3d at 298 (“the District Court properly
took into account the potential bias of the
Checkpoint System’s employees who
testified [regarding actual confusion].”); A
& H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret
Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 227 (3d Cir.
2000) (“The District Court, while not
explicitly discrediting this evidence,
viewed it with great skepticism, given the
interested sources and the inability to
cross-examine the supposedly confused
individuals.”).  It was, therefore, proper for
the District Court here to establish
guidelines to ensure that the evidence met
the standards of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
Witnesses for both CFG and
CNBEC acknowledged that customer
confusion between banks frequently
occurred, regardless of bank names.
“Ownership of a trademark does not
guarantee total absence of confusion in the
marketplace.  Selection of a mark with a
common surname naturally entails a risk of
uncertainty and the law will not assure
absolute protection.”  Scott Paper Co. v.
Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225,
1231 (3d Cir. 1978).  The Court was
familiar with the evidence gathered during
discovery and was in the best position to
determine the safeguards for relevance and
reliability in this case.  The Court did not
abuse its discretion in requiring CNBEC’s
written evidence to specifically refer to
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CFG or Mellon to ensure that the jury
received only relevant evidence.  Saada,
212 F.3d at 220. 
Likewise, the Court did not abuse
its discretion in requiring CNBEC’s
evidence to exclude entries that reflected
the thought process, conclusion, or
interpretation of the CNBEC employees
who recorded the entries.  It was proper for
the Court to make such requirement under
Fed. R. Evid. 803(1).  See United States v.
Guevara, 277 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2001)
(upholding determination that hearsay
statements did not qualify as “present
sense impression” under Rule 803(1)
because they “were conclusions based
upon information [the recorder] had
processed rather than contemporaneous or
spontaneous statements that were
inherently trustworthy”) reh’g denied, 298
F.3d 182 (2nd Cir. 2002); Vitek Sys., Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 675 F.2d 190, 194 (8th Cir.
1982) (concluding  tha t  h earsay
memorandum did not qualify as present
sense impression because company sought
to elicit its employee’s evaluation of the
customer’s thought process).  Nonetheless,
the District Court’s guidelines permitted
written hearsay evidence that reflected “an
explanation or description of the event
rather than a narration.”  The guidelines
conformed to the requirements of Rule
803(1).  We, therefore, conclude that the
Court did not abuse its discretion and did
not err in setting up the guideline
requirements.  
C. The Discussion of Evidence of
Widespread Third-Party Use of the Word
“Citizens” by Other Banking Institutions
CFG introduced evidence showing
that “Citizens” was commonly used by
banks both in Pennsylvania and throughout
the United States:  8 banks, in addition to
CFG, use “Citizens” in Pennsylvania;
banks with “Citizens” in their name
coexist in six zip codes in Pennsylvania;
more than 350 FDIC-insured banks use
“Citizens” in their trade names throughout
the United States and they operate more
than 2,400 separate branches; “Citizens” is
the ninth most commonly used bank name;
and approximately 4% of FDIC-insured
banks have Citizens in their names.
CNBEC appeals from the District Court’s
denial of its motion in limine to exclude
evidence of widespread third-party use of
Citizens-formative trademarks outside its
market area.
In this case, the jury found that
CNBEC had used the mark “Citizens,” that
the mark was very distinctive (either
“suggestive,” “arbitrary,” or “fanciful),
and that there was a likelihood of
confusion between CFG’s marks and
CNBEC’s “Citizens” mark.   Thus, the
jury found infringement by CFG, and
CNBEC prevailed on this claim.  Yet,
CNBEC argues that the Court erred in
allowing evidence of widespread third
party use because it “is not relevant to
determining the strength of CNBEC’s
mark within its marketplace.”  We need
not tarry on this issue.  First, as a general
rule, widespread use of even a distinctive
mark may weaken the mark.  See, e.g.,
Petro Stopping Ctrs, L.P. v. James River
Petroleum, Inc., 130 F.3d 88, 93-94 (4th
15
Cir. 1997) (explaining how evidence of
broad third party use of a suggestive mark
may be relevant to show the weakness of
the mark).  Thus, we believe this evidence
was likely relevant.  Further, any
conceivable error was harmless because
the jury found in favor of CNBEC on this
issue of infringement and the strength of
its mark.  Accordingly, we will not reverse
the admission of this testimony.
III.  Molding the Verdict
Announcing its decision to deny
injunctive relief to CNBEC, and instead to
enjoin CNBEC, the District Court
explained that it was “molding the verdict
entered by the jury and entering a verdict
in favor of CFG and against CNBEC on
the declaratory judgement claim and on all
counterclaims filed by CNBEC against
CFG.”  This “molding” is troublesome,
given that the jury found that CNBEC had
a protected interest in the mark “Citizens,”
and that there was a likelihood of
confusion between the marks, constituting
CFG’s infringement on CNBEC’s mark.
The District Court had informed the jury
during its instructions that “if you find that
there is a likelihood of confusion caused
by CFG’s use of the mark Citizens Bank,
then CNBEC will be able to prevent CFG
from using the mark Citizens Bank in
those areas where CNBEC has established
a significant market presence.”
The Supreme Court observed in
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.
Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364
(1962):
Where there is a view of
the case that makes the
jury’s answers to special
interrogatories consistent,
they must be resolved that
way.  For a search for one
possible view of the case
which will make the jury’s
findings inconsistent results
in a collision with the
Seventh Amendment.
Our circuit has interpreted Atlantic
& Gulf Stevedores to mean that “a verdict
must be molded consistently with a jury’s
answers to special interrogatories when
there is any view of the case which
reconciles the various answers.”  McAdam
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d
750, 763 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Bradford-
White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d
1153, 1159 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 993 (1989) (emphasis added).
Thus, trial courts must proceed “under a
constitutional mandate to search for a view
of the case that makes the jury’s answers
consistent.”  McAdam, 896 F.2d at 764
(quoting United States v. 0.78 Acres of
Land, More or Less, 81 F.R.D. 618, 621
(E.D.Pa. 1979) aff’d without opinion, 609
F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1979).
In our view, the District Court’s
“molding” in this case has produced a
collision with the Seventh Amendment.
T h e  D i s t r ic t  C o u r t  su b m i t t e d
interrogatories to the jury under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 49(b) to decide those issues of fact
necessary for a verdict.  In response to the
Court’s first interrogatory, the jury found
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in the affirmative that CNBEC had proven
that it had used “Citizens” standing alone
as a trademark.  In response to the second
interrogatory, it found that the mark
“Citizens” standing alone was suggestive,
arbitrary or fanciful.  Skipping to the
fourth interrogatory, the jury also found in
the affirmative that a likelihood of
confusion existed between CFG’s mark
and CNBEC’s “Citizens” standing-alone
mark.  Taken together, these responses
constituted a finding that CFG had
infringed on CNBEC’s trademark.
However, in the sixth interrogatory, the
jury found that CNBEC had not been
“injured” by the infringement, meaning
that no money damages would be awarded.
The critical question in “molding”
cases such as this is “whether the jury’s
answers in the verdict are necessarily
inconsistent with each other.”  Loughman
v. Consol-Penn. Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 104
(3d Cir. 1993).  Upon review, we hold that
the jury’s findings in this case were not
inconsistent, and no molding was
necessary to harmonize them.  It is
completely feasible under trademark law
that a trademark owner may infringe on
another’s mark, and yet the senior user
may not suffer any economic damages.
The “molding” in this case only became
necessary when the District Court decided
that despite the jury’s finding of
infringement by CFG over CNBEC’s
senior rights, it would still grant
declaratory judgment in favor of CFG,
thereby allowing CFG to use its registered
trademark in CNBEC’s market area.  
The problem which triggered the
molding of the verdict originated with the
Court’s framing of the sixth interrogatory.
The Court presided over the lengthy and
complex trial before the jury patiently and
competently.  In framing the sixth
interrogatory, however, the District Court
erroneously formulated the question in
terms of “injury,” rather than in terms of
monetary damages or unjust enrichment.
“Injury” is a much broader concept than
the issues of money damages or unjust
enrichment which were properly before the
jury in this case.  An injury is “any wrong
or damage done to another, either to his
person, rights, reputation, or property.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7 (1965)
defines injury as “the invasion of any
legally protected interest of another.”  The
jury, however, was not asked to decide the
legal rights of the parties; its function was
to find facts regarding infringement and
arrive at a verdict regarding CNBEC’s
claims for monetary relief.  The District
Court instructed the jury that if it found for
CNBEC on unfair competition and its
trademark infringement claims, it must
determine whether “CFG be required to
pay CNBEC the monetary damages that
CNBEC sustained as a consequence of
CFG’s wrongful acts.”   The Court defined
actual damages as meaning “the amount of
money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate CNBEC for an injury you find
was caused by CFG’s use of the mark
‘Citizen’s Bank.’”  Pursuant to its jury
instructions, the Court should have molded
the jury verdict, as it may now be required,
to reflect the sixth interrogatory to the jury
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as though it were framed in terms of
money damages and unjust enrichment
rather than “injury.”
We have clearly held that
“trademark infringement amounts to
irreparable injury as a matter of law.”
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d
228, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting S & R
Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d
371, 378 (3d Cir. 1992)).  Therefore, the
jury’s finding of “no injury” must be
limited to the context of economic
damages.  The jury verdict may not be
used to supplant the principle that CFG’s
infringement constitutes a legal injury to
CNBEC as a matter of law.  The District
Court’s molding of the jury’s verdict to
encompass a lack of injury beyond the
money damages was in error.  It was this
error that led the Court to enter judgment
for CFG on its complaint for declaratory
judgment.  Accordingly, the District
Court’s molding of the verdict and the
entry of declaratory judgment for CFG will
be reversed.  Upon remand, the District
Court is instructed to vacate the judgment
and to enter judgment in accordance with
the jury’s finding of infringement by CFG,
consistent with this opinion.
IV.  The Injunction
Although we have stated that
trademark infringement is an “irreparable
injury as a matter of law,” id., we have
also held that “the irreparable injury we
referred to was not intended to swallow the
remaining prongs of the permanent
injunction inquiry.”  Gucci, 354 F.3d at
237.  With that admonition in mind, we
turn to the District Court’s ruling on
CNBEC’s motion for a permanent
injunction.
Several days after the jury returned
its verdict, the District Court turned to
CNBEC's motion for a permanent
injunction to enjoin CFG from offering or
advertising retail banking services under
the mark "Citizens Bank" in CNBEC's
claimed market area.  The judge apparently
had received memoranda on the issue, but
took no new testimony, evidence or oral
argument.  Without citing any authority
except the factors set forth in Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 35, the
judge delivered an oral opinion denying
CNBEC’s motion.  Based on the jury
verdict finding no likelihood of confusion
between CFG’s marks and CNBEC’s full
mark of “Citizens National Bank,” the
Court, sua sponte imposed an injunction
on CNBEC requiring it to use the term
“National” as part of its name “when it
first refers to itself in any document,
advertising or promotion regardless of type
or medium used.”
On appeal, CNBEC argues that the
District Court erred by enjoining it from
using its shortened “Citizens” mark, and
failing to grant its application for a
permanent injunction against CFG.
Further, CNBEC argues that this Court had
never endorsed the “Restatement Factors”
that the District Court relied on to reach its
decision.
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition § 35(2), upon which the
District Court relied, states:
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The appropriateness and scope of
injunctive relief depend upon a
comparative appraisal of all the factors of
the case, including the following primary
factors:
(a) the nature of the interest to be
protected;
(b) the nature and extent of the
wrongful conduct;
(c) the relative adequacy to the
plaintiff of an injunction and of other
remedies;
(d) the relative harm likely to result
to the legitimate interests of the defendant
if an injunction is granted and to the
legitimate interests of the plaintiff if the
injunction is denied;
(e) the interests of third persons
and the public;
(f) any unreasonable delay by the
plaintiff in bringing suit or otherwise
asserting his rights;
(g) any related misconduct on the
part of the plaintiff; and 
(h) the practicality of framing and
enforcing an injunction. 
CNBEC  argues that th e
Restatement Factors have not been
adopted by the courts because they are ill-
suited for the task of crafting permanent
injunctive relief.  The factors, it asserts,
are better suited in considering preliminary
injunctions, which are extraordinary
remedies requiring courts to carefully
evaluate the “balance of harm” before the
ultimate determination of infringement.
AM Gen. Corp. v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.,
311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002);  Lermer
& Germany GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94
F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
We review a District Court’s
decision to grant or deny a permanent
injunction under an abuse of discretion
standard.  A.C.L.U. of N.J. v. Black Horse
Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471,
1476 (3d Cir. 1996).  “An abuse of
discretion exists where the District Court’s
decision rests upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of
law, or an improper application of law to
fact.”  Id. (quoting Int’l Union U.A.W. v.
Mack Trucks, Inc. 820 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir.
1987)).  “[W]e will not interfere with the
district court's exercise of discretion
‘unless there is a definite and firm
conviction that the court . . . committed a
clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
reached upon a weighing of the relevant
factors.’”  Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670,
683 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 
We are hesitant to endorse any
finite set of factors for consideration in
determining the equities of injunctive
relief.  In fact, the District Court prefaced
its consideration of these factors with the
statement that “equity is the key
consideration in determining a proper
remedy once a likelihood of confusion
exists.”  Even the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition § 35(2) explains that
weighing injunctive relief requires “a
comparative appraisal of all the factors of
the case.”  In order to determine whether
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the District Court abused its discretion in
this matter, however, we must review the
Restatement Factors that were considered.
The first factor, the nature of the
interest to be protected, weighed in favor
of denying the injunction according to the
District Court.  The Court explained that
even though the jury found “Citizens”
standing alone to be CNBEC’s lawful
trademark, 12 U.S.C. § 22 requires that
CNBEC “include in its name the word
‘national’ when identifying itself.”
However, this federal statute relating to the
organization’s Certificate of National
Banking Association only requires that
persons uniting to form such associations
“shall . . . make an organization certificate
which shall specifically state: first, the
name assumed by such association; which
shall include the word ‘National.’”  12
U.S.C. § 22.  Nothing in this statutory
language inhibits a national bank from
using a diminutive of its name for
advertising purposes, especially when it is
so known by its customers or the
community it serves.  Moreover, the
statute expressly requires that the name
“National” be used in the organization
certificate; it does not address other
situations in which the name may be used,
and certainly not in advertising media. We
see no basis in the statute to support the
District Court’s assertion. 
The Court also explained under the
first factor that hundreds of banks
throughout the United States use
“Citizens” in their name.  Yet, this inquiry
is appropriate for determining the strength
of the mark, which was determined by the
jury, not the nature of the mark owner’s
interest to be protected.  The District Court
should have focused instead on the actual
interests to be protected, i.e. the public
interest in avoiding confusion and
CNBEC’s interest in maintaining control
over its mark and avoiding injury to
reputation and goodwill.  We see nothing
in this factor which favors the infringer.
As to the second factor, the nature
and extent of the wrongful conduct, the
Court was not persuaded that CFG acted in
bad faith or that it deliberately infringed on
CNBEC’s mark.  CFG may not have acted
in bad faith, but it deliberately advertised
in the marketplace where CNBEC had
engaged in banking for over one hundred
years without any trademark infringement.
CFG did not enter CNBEC’s marketplace
inadvertently; its conduct was deliberately
conceived, planned and implemented by a
l a rge  a n d  a g gress iv e  f ina nc ia l
organization.  Thus, although we accept
the District Court’s determination that
CFG did not act in bad faith, we see
nothing in this factor that weighs against
an injunction. 
Regarding the third factor, the
relative adequacy to CNBEC of an
injunction, the Court again relied on its
overly broad interpretation of the federal
statute requiring the inclusion of the word
“National” in CNBEC’s name.  The Court
concluded that CNBEC “can protect the
values of its trademark” without a
permanent injunction prohibiting CFG
from using its mark.  For the reasons we
set forth in our discussion of the first
factor, this conclusion of law, although the
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District Court stated it as a finding, is
without any legal or factual basis.   Even
though CNBEC may be able to avoid some
confusion by using the word “National” in
its name, the equities do not necessarily
support forcing CNBEC to take such
measures given that it is the senior user of
the “Citizens” mark and the victim of
trademark infringement.
In the fourth factor, a balancing of
the relative harm to the legitimate interests
of the parties if the injunction is denied,
the Court concluded that “[a] full
injunction would have devastating effects
on CFG’s business and its customers” and
that “it would potentially prevent CFG
from using its name not just in CNBEC’s
market area, but throughout Pennsylvania
. . . .”  There is nothing in the record to
support these conclusions.  First, CNBEC
seeks to enjoin CFG, at most, from
offering or advertising retail banking
services under the mark “Citizens Bank”
only in Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver and
Butler counties, and not the rest of
Pennsylvania.  The District Court also
noted that CNBEC did not prove it had
penetrated the market in Armstrong and
Beaver counties and in the Greater
Pittsburgh area.
Thus, an injunction could be easily
tailored to CNBEC’s proven market area,
a modest part of Western Pennsylvania.2
Such a limited injunction could in no way
“potentially prevent” CFG from using its
name throughout Pennsylvania.  With a
giant institution operating hundreds of
branches throughout the east coast of the
United States, it is an enormous stretch of
imagination to conclude that an injunction
l imi t ed  to  severa l  coun t ies  in
Pennsylvania would have “devastating
effects on CFG’s business and customers.”
The record does not support this broad
statement.  
Furthermore, in considering this
factor, the District Court ignored the jury’s
finding that CFG’s use of the “Citizens
Bank” mark in the CNBEC market area
created a likelihood of public confusion
that could harm CNBEC’s interest in its
mark.  The Court simply stated in
conclusory fashion that CNBEC “has
failed to demonstrate damage to its
reputation and goodwill” as a result of
CFG’s infringement.  This statement
disregards the record that undisputably
shows CNBEC has operated as a bank, at
least in Butler County, for over one
hundred years and has built substantial
community goodwill that it seeks to
protect in the future.  As we noted in
Commerce Nat’l Ins. Servs., Inc. v.
Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., a similar
case involving reverse confusion, “[w]e
think it a reasonable inference that during
    2 According to the United States
Federal Census of 2000, of which we
take judicial notice, all of Armstrong
County had only a population of 55,818
persons eighteen years and older; Beaver
County, 140,350; Butler County,
131,235; and all of Allegheny County,
including the Greater Pittsburgh Area,
1,000,490.
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those thirteen years, [the senior user] was
able to build up substantial goodwill for its
general insurance services under [its]
mark.”  214 F.3d 432, 443 (3d Cir. 2000)
(footnote omitted).  In this case, too, we
believe that after the use of CNBEC’s
trademark name in a limited rural area of
Western Pennsylvania over many years, its
expansion in that area during this period,
and the record of its consistent and broad
advertisement of its business and name
over those many years, one can reasonably
infer that infringement against CNBEC’s
trademark will adversely affect its
reputation and goodwill.  Balancing the
relative harm to the legitimate interests of
the parties clearly favors CNBEC and not
the infringer.
As to the fifth factor, the interest of
third parties and the public, the District
Court was of the opinion that a permanent
injunction, as requested, would increase
confusion rather than prevent it.  It reached
this conclusion on the supposition that an
injunction would require CFG to change
its name, but CFG still would be required
to indicate to consumers “that it was
owned by or otherwise affiliated with
Citizens Bank.”  A tailored permanent
injunction, however, need not affect the
name for CFG’s hundreds of branches
outside of the limited area constituting
CNBEC’s market area.  A permanent
injunction need not require that CFG
operate any branches in CNBEC’s
marketplace, nor would it bar CFG from
operating an independent affiliate under a
different name in the enjoined areas.  
As we stated in United States
Jaycees v. Phila. Jaycees, “avoidance of
confusion should always be a major
concern of a court in a trademark case,”
and “actual confusion need not be shown.
Rather, only the likelihood of confusion is
required.”  639 F.2d 134, 142 (3d Cir.
1981).  We further stated in that case,
“[p]rotection of infringers is not a purpose
of the Lanham Act.  On the contrary, the
Act’s objective is the protection of the
trademark and the public.”  Id.  We
recognize the District Court’s legitimate
concern that a strict injunction against
CFG could cause further public confusion
for CFG’s customers, particularly
considering CFG’s national scope and the
proliferation of internet banking.
However, potential public confusion
should not be considered to the exclusion
of trademark protection.  Rather, we
believe that in this case this factor should
be read as a mandate to craft injunctive
relief that will minimize confusion, rather
than abandoning injunctive relief all
together.
As to the sixth factor, delay in suing
the infringer, the Court found no delay on
the part of CNBEC in bringing its claims.
Thus, the Court did not consider this factor
important.  Because CNBEC did act
promptly to protect its rights, we believe
that if this factor is to be given any weight,
it would favor CNBEC’s application for
injunction.
The Court considered that the
seventh factor, misconduct on the part of
CNBEC, weighed heavily against the grant
of an injunction.  CFG alleges that
CNBEC dropped the word “National” in
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its advertisements following CFG’s
entrance in the market in order to increase
confusion and advance its litigation
strategy.  The Court concluded that there
was evidence in e-mails and memos from
CNBEC’s marketing team and other
employees “that indicated that CNBEC
took affirmative actions aimed at
increasing confusion to further their own
efforts in this case.”  These efforts, the
Court found, all occurred after CFG
announced its intention to enter the
market.  The Court believed this “clear
evidence of unclean hands is significant.”
Although there is some evidence of
at least consideration of a plan by CNBEC
to enhance their litigation position, the
District Court took a severe view of the
evidence and allowed this evidence to
overshadow the merits of the plaintiff’s
claim and the public’s interests.  See
Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo
Utilities, 319 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1963)
(“Unclean hands, then, does not stand as a
defense that may be properly considered
independent of the merits of the plaintiff's
claim . . . .”).
In the interests of right and
justice the courts should
not automatically condone
the defendant’s infractions
because the plaintiff is also
blam ew or thy, thereby
h a v i n g  t w o  w r o n g s
unremedied and increasing
the injury to the public.
Rather the court must
weigh the substance of the
right asserted by the
p la in ti f f  a g ains t  th e
transgression which, it is
contended , se rves to
foreclose that right.
Id.
In a trademark infringement action,
“the court must show solicitude for the
public in evaluating an unclean hands
defense.”  Donoghue v. IBC/USA
(Publications), Inc., 886 F. Supp. 947, 954
(D. Mass. 1995).  Because a central
concern in an unfair competition case is
protection of the public from confusion,
courts require clear, convincing evidence
of “egregious” misconduct before
invoking the doctrine of unclean hands.
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co.,
Inc., 747 F.2d 844, 855 (3d Cir. 1984).
Furthermore, “the extent of actual harm
caused by the conduct in question, either to
the defendant or to the public interest, is a
highly relevant consideration.”  Republic
Molding Corp., 319 F.2d at 349-350.
There is very little evidence in this
case that the thoughts or suggestions of
CNBEC’s advertising agencies or its
marketing team were ever implemented or
carried into effect.  Whether CNBEC
executives disapproved or rejected those
ideas or suggestions is not clear in this
record, but it is clear that any actual
implementation of this strategy was minor.
The District Court, in its oral opinion,
referred to evidence of e-mails from
CNBEC’s marketing teams and its ad
agencies “regarding a change in the ads to
make its ads seem more like those of
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CFG.”  The Court, however, did not point
to any advertisements that CNBEC used to
implement these changes. 
CFG argues that CNBEC amended
its policy of referring to itself in the first
instance as “Citizens National Bank,” and
began using “Citizens” alone more
frequently to highlight the similarity with
CFG’s marks.  CFG points to one ad that
was run originally in 2000, and again in
2002, where the 2002 version shortened its
name in the text of the add from “Citizens
National Bank” to “Citizens.”  CNBEC
counters this claim, explaining that its
internal communication guidelines from
1995, prior to CFG’s entrance, state clearly
that the bank will refer to itself as either
“Citizens National Bank” or “Citizens” in
all  communications.   Theref ore ,
particu larly when CNBEC’s ads
prominently display the CNBEC logo with
“Citizens National Bank” in large print in
the layout as a first reference, the bank
may refer to itself with either its full or
shortened name in the text of an ad and
still be within its guidelines.
CFG also argues that CNBEC
created a welcome letter for new
customers stating “[y]ou may have already
noticed that Citizens is not your ordinary
bank,” in an attempt to create confusion
with CFG’s tagline of “not your typical
bank.”  However, CNBEC explained that
this sentence referred to a marketing
phrase “Beyond the Ordinary,” which
CNBEC had used well before CFG entered
the market.
We believe that although there is
evidence that CNBEC employees
discussed amendments to a limited number
of advertisements in order to enhance its
litigation position, the evidence does not
support “egregious” conduct on the part of
CNBEC to create consumer confusion.
This evidence may also be explained as
CNBEC’s attempt to hold its ground by
utilizing its “Citizens” mark, rather than
conceding the name to CFG.  Any effort
by CNBEC to assert the name “Citizens,”
which CNBEC spent many years
cultivating as a recognizable trademark,
does not automatically require a finding of
unclean hands.  Furthermore, the
speculative evidence presented by CFG
does not include any actual instances of
consumer confusion based on CNBEC’s
actions.  We do not believe that the
isolated documents produced by CFG and
relied on by the District Court constitute
clear, convincing and unequivocal
evidence that would reasonably support a
finding of unclean hands.  Kearney &
Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc.,
562 F.2d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1977).  We
hold that the District Court’s heavy
reliance on the doctrine of unclean hands
to justify its denial of injunctive relief
improperly weighted that evidence to the
exclusion of the merits of CNBEC’s claim
and the public interest, and constituted an
abuse of discretion.
The District Court also concluded
that the last factor, the practicality of
framing and enforcing an injunction,
weighs in favor of denying a permanent
injunction.  It observed that CFG “is a
large bank with many branches and
24
consumers spanning a large geographical
area over many states” and that injunctive
relief “would be difficult, if not impossible
to enforce.”  At the utmost, CNBEC seeks
injunctive relief in only four counties.  An
injunction limited to the area of CNBEC’s
market penetration would not require
enforcement in the rest of Pennsylvania or
the United States.  The numerous branches
and geographical dispersion of the
infringer’s network does not provide it
with a blanket insulating it from action
against its infringement.  No infringer is
immune from challenge because of its size.
Neither the principles of equity nor the
federal Constitution favor the rights of the
powerful over the rights of the weak
merely because of size.
Referring to consumer protection
as the “foremost purpose of trademark
law,” the Court again referred to CNBEC’s
alleged unclean hands as the cause of the
consumer confusion.  As we stated
previously, we see no evidence to support
this assertion.  The Court was further
influenced by its interpretation of 12
U.S.C. § 22 requiring CNBEC to use
“National” in its name, plus the jury’s
finding of no likelihood of confusion
between defendant’s marks and the
“Citizens National Bank” mark.  We have
already addressed our disagreement with
the District Court’s interpretation of 12
U.S.C. § 22, and there is no need to repeat
it here.  Reliance on the jury’s finding of
an absence of confusion between CFG’s
marks and the “Citizens National Bank”
does not respond to the jury’s finding of
infringement with respect to CNBEC’s
mark in “Citizens” standing alone and the
likelihood of confusion between that mark
and CFG’s.  Thus, these factors, even
when combined with the Court’s reliance
on the other factors to which it deferred, is
not a sufficient ground to support the
Court’s denial of injunctive relief.
Accordingly, we conclude that
CNBEC is entitled to enjoin CFG from the
use of the mark “Citizens” in CNBEC’s
marketplace.  “The law of trademark
protects trademark owners in the exclusive
use of their marks when use by another
would be likely to cause confusion.”
Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d
460, 462 (3d Cir. 1983).  Although
CNBEC’s mark is unregistered, the jury
found that CFG had a protected interest in
the mark, and that CFG infringed on
CNBEC’s use creating a likelihood of
consumer confusion.  The concurrent use
of a trademark where a likelihood of
confusion exists damages the public
interest.  Jiffy Lube, 968 F.2d at 379.  A
finding of infringement or the likelihood
of confusion with the concurrent use of the
infringed trademark implicitly signifies a
loss of expectation and goodwill as well.
The infringement amounts to borrowing
the senior user’s reputation and goodwill,
which is an injury in and of itself, even
without evidence of actual loss of
goodwill.  See Opticians Ass’n of Am. v.
Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187,
195 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Ambassador E.,
Inc. v. Orsatti, Inc., 257 F.2d 79, 82 (3d
Cir. 1958)). 
When we consider CNBEC’s
reverse confusion harm in light of the
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foregoing, the engagement of the parties in
the same line of business, CFG’s
awareness of the senior’s use of the mark,
and the jury’s verdict, there can be no
doubt of a strong likelihood of reverse
confusion in this case despite CNBEC’s
use of the term “National.”  CFG’s ability
to promote its mark, in light of its
enormous resources and many branches, is
significantly greater than CNBEC’s.
“Without the recognition of reverse
confusion, smaller senior users would have
little protection against larger, more
powerful companies who want to use
ident ica l o r  confusingly simila r
trademarks.”  Fisons Horticulture, 30 F.3d
at 475.  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
has been interpreted by this and other
circuits  to protect against such
infringements by large entities, and we
will uphold that principle here.  Id.
Accordingly, the District Court’s refusal to
enjoin CFG’s infringement constituted an
abuse of discretion, and we will reverse.  
The more difficult problem arises
in the framing of the injunction.  CNBEC
asserts that an injunction should embrace
all of Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver and
Butler counties.  It claims that the District
Court’s advisory ruling that CNBEC’s
trademark rights extend only as far as the
location of its physical branches is legally
erroneous.  It argues that in determining
injunctive relief under Natural Footwear,
Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx 760 F.2d
1383, 1398-99 (3d Cir. 1985), the extent
should be governed by (1) the senior user’s
value of the sales, (2) growth trends, (3)
market shares, and (4) amount and scope
of advertising.  Under these factors,
CNBEC maintains an injunction should
encompass the entire four-county area,
including the Pittsburgh metropolitan
region.  CNBEC asserts that this relief is
necessary to protect the public interest and
its rights.
CFG, on the contrary, points out
that CNBEC’s branches are located in and
immediately adjacent to Butler County.
Almost all of its customer accounts are in
Butler and Northern Allegheny counties.
Dr. Crane, a Harvard business professor
testifying on behalf of CFG as an expert
witness, explained that CNBEC’s market
should be limited to its core locations in
Butler and Northern Allegheny Counties
because “75% of customers open a
checking account within four miles of
where they live or work.”
Looking at CNBEC’s share of
market deposits, Dr. Crane found that
CNBEC accounts for about 13% of
deposits in Butler County, 2% in
Armstrong county, less than 1% in
Allegheny County, and less than 1% in
Beaver County.  On cross-examination,
Dr. Crane also acknowledged that if an
injunction issued against CFG because of
the likelihood of confusion caused by the
use of its name, federal regulations would
not bar CFG from using a different name
on its branches in the enjoined territory.
CNBEC had approximately 9,886
accounts in northern Allegheny County as
of August 1, 2001.  Those accounts
represented approximately $50 million in
deposits and approximately $90 million in
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loans.  Don Shoney, CEO and Chief
Operating Officer of CNBEC, testified that
the branch in Northtowne Square in
Northern Allegheny County was CNBEC’s
southernmost facility.  He also testified
that the banks consumer market centered
around its branches but that a much
broader market existed for its business
accounts and for its non-traditional
products such as life insurance, trust
services and brokerages, where there is no
need to be linked to a physical location.
Although CNBEC lays claim to a
four-county market largely because its
advertising in print and broadcast media
reaches this area, we do not agree that its
market extends this far.  This Court stated
in Natural Footwear that “the senior user
of a common law mark may not be able to
obtain relief against the junior user in an
area where it has no established trade, and
hence no reputation and good will.”  760
F.2d at 1394.  On the other hand, as we
pointed out in Scott Paper Co., 589 F.3d at
1231, the grant of a monopoly to CFG by
virtue of the federal registration under the
Lanham Act should not be liberally
construed.  The rights granted to the
registered user should not be extended.
We believe the District Court correctly
found CNBEC’s market penetration
included Butler County and the Northern
part of Allegheny County.  We do not at
this time express any opinion as to the
market penetration in Armstrong and
Beaver counties, and we leave that
determination for the District Court upon
remand. As an appellate court one
step removed from the facts of this case,
we are hesitant to enunciate the ultimate
contours of the injunction.  As we noted
above, the District Court identified valid
concerns regarding potential confusion
among CFG’s customers in the region, as
well as confusion that may arise from
required disclosure of the name “Citizens
Bank” for customers using ATMs outside
of the region or internet banking.  Upon
remand, we will instruct the District Court
to explore these issues and develop the
specific limitations in the injunction that
will mitigate these potential sources of
confusion.
V.  Cross-Appeal
CFG filed a conditional cross-
appeal in the event that this Court should
reverse the District Court’s injunction.  We
now address that appeal.
A.
CFG challenges the District Court’s
evidentiary ruling allowing testimony from
CNBEC tellers regarding their experiences
with customers confused between the two
banks.  CFG claims this testimony was
inadmissible hearsay.  “To the extent the
district court's admission of evidence was
based on an interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, our standard of review
is plenary.  But we review the Court's
decision to admit the evidence if premised
on a permissible view of the law for an
abuse of discretion.” United States v.
Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 1992).
CFG points to no specific instances
of a teller testifying to out-of-court
statements asserted for their truth.  Even
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by CFG’s description, the tellers described
their personal experiences with customers
at the bank, which is not inconsistent with
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).  Furthermore, “the
plaintiffs' own testimony about the actual
behavior of their customers is not
hearsay.”  Calahan v. A.E.V., Inc., 182
F.3d 237, 253 (3d Cir. 1999).  In this case,
the tellers described what they saw and the
action they took with respect to customers
who appeared to be confused with respect
to CFG and CNBEC.  This is not hearsay.
Further, Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) allows
statements, otherwise excluded as hearsay,
to be received to show the declarant’s
then-existing state of mind.  Id. at 251.  To
the extent that any of the customers’
statements may be deemed hearsay, we
believe Rule 803(3) would apply.  Thus,
the District Court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting this testimony. 
B.
CFG also complains that the
District Court erred in its jury instruction
concerning the determination of CNBEC’s
rights in the mark “Citizens” standing
alone.  CFG asserts that the District
Court’s instruction did not require a
finding that CNBEC had consistently used
“Citizens” as a trademark over time prior
to CFG’s entry in the market.  The legal
accuracy of jury instructions are reviewed
de novo.  See United States v. Khorozian,
333 F.3d 498, 507-08 (3d Cir. 2003).
CFG argues that the undisputed
evidence shows that CNBEC started using
the mark standing alone consistently only
after CFG entered the market.  CFG argues
that had the instruction required a temporal
finding, the jury would not have found that
CNBEC obtained trademark rights in
“Citizens.”
CFG’s argument relies upon a
single passage from the instructions that
does not include a temporal instruction
regarding CNBEC’s use of “Citizens.”
However, the scope of review for a jury
instruction is whether, when taken as a
whole, they properly apprise the jury of the
issues and the applicable law.  Khorozian,
333 F.3d at 508 (explaining that courts
review “the totality of the instructions and
not a particular sentence or paragraph in
isolation.”);  Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d
500, 512 (3d Cir. 2002);  Tigg Corp. v.
Dow Corning Corp., 962 F.2d 1123 (3d
Cir. 1992).
Upon review of the instructions, it
is clear that the District Court instructed
the jury specifically that in order to be a
senior user of a mark, CNBEC’s rights
should be evaluated prior to CFG’s entry
into the disputed market area in July, 2001.
In describing secondary meaning, the
Court explained that the jury must consider
consumer perception of the mark “prior to
CFG’s entry.”  This Court presumes that
the jury followed the Court’s instructions.
United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 462
(3d Cir. 2003), United States v. Syme, 276
F.2d 131, 155 (3d Cir. 2002).  Thus, we
presume that the jury considered
CNBEC’s use of “Citizens” prior to CFG’s
entrance to the market in determining that
CNBEC had a protected interest in the
trademark.
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The District Court’s evidentiary
ruling and the challenged jury instruction
raised in CFG’s cross-appeal will be
affirmed.
VI.  Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing,
the evidentiary rulings and jury
instructions of the District Court during
the jury trial and the order denying the
motion for a new trial are affirmed.
However, the judgment of the District
Court entered in favor of Citizens
Financial Group’s (CFG’s) complaint for
a declaratory judgment will be vacated.
The case will be remanded to the District
Court to mold the verdict to reflect that
Citizens National Bank of Evans City
(CNBEC) has not proven that it has
suffered money damages as a proximate
result of CFG’s infringement, but also with
directions to enter judgment in favor of
CNBEC on the declaratory judgment
claim, stating that CFG is not entitled to a
declaratory judgment allowing its use of
“Citizens” in CNBEC’s market area.
The District Court’s denial of
CNBEC’s motion for injunctive relief, and
the subsequent injunction issued against
CNBEC requiring its use of the term
“National” as part of its name when it first
refers to itself in any document or
advertising, will be vacated.  On remand to
the District Court, it is directed to enter an
order permanently enjoining CFG from
offering or advertising retail banking
services under the mark “Citizens Bank”
in Butler County and to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine the
specific contours of CNBEC’s market area
in the other three disputed counties.
The District Court is directed to
strike from its opinion its statement that
“future actions by CNBEC based upon
additional evidence of consumer confusion
occurring after November 1, 2002, would
be frivolous and unwarranted.”
Sixty percent of the costs will be
taxed against CFG.
